[처용]Goldman Sach 에널 분석보고서의 고객기만.외곡- WSJ 8/25 보도

경제 2009. 8. 26. 14:25

Goldman Sach 에널 분석보고서의 고객기만.외곡- WSJ 8/25 보도
처용kiyoung****

번호 758298 | 09.08.26 11:45 IP 121.161.***.112
조회 99

얼마전에 올란글에서(삼성증권 센타장 항복...) 나는 국내의 에널들이나 월가의 에널들의 태성적인 한계점을 애기하며 그들의 경제전망.기업분석.시황분석등 분석보고서에 그신뢰성에 대해 의문 제기한적이 있다 제도권의 자본시장 특히 주식시장은 다른 재화가 거래되는 시장 보다도 치열한 양육강식과 적자생존이 지배하는 정글과 같이 하시라도 주의를 게을리하고 방심하면 길을 잃고 나락으로 떨어져 깊은 정글속에서 헤메다가 결국은 탐욕과 기만의 먹이가 되는 소위 말하는 머니게임이 지배하는 정글과 같은 곳이다.

어짜피 저번글 에서도 애기 헀드시 경제전망이나 상황등의 분석은 경제외적인 여러가지 상황변수가 존재 하고 앞으로 변할 수 있는 인간의 한계를 넘는 변수가 존재하여 전망은 단지 전망일 뿐이지 절대적 가치를 두기에는 그자체에 내재적인 한계가 있는 것이다 따라서 자기가 예측한 경제전망이나 주식전망이 적중했다고 경제상황의 분석이나 전망에서 스스로 자신감과 보람을 느껴도 교만은 경계 하여야 하고 더욱 열심히 공부하고 연구를 개을리 하지 말아야 한다고 생각한다 경제학은 깊이 파고 들수록 더욱 끝이 없는 것같고 형체가 잡일것 같으면서 손에 잡히지 않고...아마 "Invisible hand"(보이지 않는 손) 와 "Animal spirits"(동물적 본능:인간의 탐욕)이 어둠 속에 존재하기 때문이 아닐까 그래서 경제학을 "dismal science"라고 애기 하는것 같다 경제적인 모든전망은(주식시장포함 여러 경제적 상황) 계량적인 모델을 근거를 할 수 밖에 없는데 전세계 각국의 경제상황의 통계는 차지 하고라도 한국가의 통계를 기반을 하여 예측을 하는 것도 한계가 있는 것이다 경제의 큰흐름이 비슷하게 자기가 예측한 방향대로 어느정도 가고 있다면 그정도로 만족해야 하지 않을까 특히 주가지수의 예측은 거의 비슷하게 적중을 하더라도 지극히 우연이라고 생각하는 것이 겸손하고 바른 자세라 생각한다.

한국가의 경제전망이나 경제주체들이 참여하는 시장을 전망 하는데는 그나라의 역사.정치 경제 사회.문화등 모든 상황을 공부.연구하여야 한다고 생각한다. 주식의 워렌버핏.채권의 빌그로스.상품의 짐 로저스.통화의 소로스.위험자산 투자의 귀재인 위버 로스등 세계적으로 내노라 하는 투자가들의 공통점은 겸손하고 미국자산가들의 관례 이기는 하지만 이면에서 지엽적이 아니라 세계적 안목으로 자산사업을 하고 있고 월가의 애널들이나 에코노미스트의 분석보고서에 얽메이지 않고 얽메일 필요도 없지만 어떠한 메스콤의 인터뷰에도 즉석에서 응해도 다방면에 걸쳐서 해박한 학식으로 답변을 할 정도로 항상 독서하고 연구를 개을리하지 않고 있다는 것이다.언젠가 워렌 버핏은 월가의 에널들의 분석 보고서는 휴지만도 못하다고 혹평을 한적도 있다 시사 하는바가 큰것이다.

따라서 일반 개인 투자자들은 주식시장에서 흔히 애기 하듯이 공짜 점심은 없으니 맹목적으로 에널들의 분석보서나 소위 말하는 금융전문가들의 애기는 참고만 하고 고정관념화되 얽메여 일회일비 하지말고 스스로 열심히 공부하고 분석하며 경제와 시장에 관계되는 모든 지식을 쌓아 자기것으로 만들고 연구.분석하여 스스로의 판단에 의해 투자를 하는 것이 바람직한 일이라고 생각한다 자만심에서 애기 하는것이 아니라 TV 에 경제연구소의 연구원들이나 소위금융전문가 라고 하는 사람들의 경제전망과 분석을 애기 하는것을 볼때는 열심히 공부하고 연구하는 연구원과 개을리 하는 연구원과는 분명히 차이가 있는 것이다 어떤 사람들은 한마디로 어이가 없는 애기를 하는것을 들을때 그애기를 듣고 투자하는 사회의 기득권 세력으로 부터 소외 받고있는 서민들인 소액의 개인투자자들을 생긱 할때 걱정을 않할 수 없는 것이다.개인 투자자들은 월가의 보고서나 국내 보고서.방송등에 맹목적으로 신뢰하고 얽메어 본인의 스스로의 판단을 흐리고 군중심리에 움직여 번번히 손실을 보고 있는 것이 안따까울 뿐이다.

상기와 같이 한주제에 대해 장황하게 설명 하는 이유는 월가의 보고서는 결정적인 순간에 외곡.호도 한다는 것은 평소에 익히 알려진 일이지만 월스트리트 저널에서 골드만 삭스의 내부문건을 입수하여 보도를 하여 시장참여자들에게 조금이나마 참고가 될것같아 글을 올리는 것이다. 기사가 장문이어 나름대로의 월가의 상식으로 종합적으로 간략하게 의역하여 요약을 하면 아래와 같다.

골드만 삭스는 회사내에서 매일 오전에 "trading huddle" 이라 칭하는 내부회의를 주제하는데 그 참석는 각분야에널. 금융상품salespeople.trader( 각기관투자가들 상대와 개인투자가들 상대 하는팀).골드만 자체자금으로 투자하는 trade.risk 관리팀등이 모여 현 시장상황과 기업체의 전망.시장에 변화를 줄만한 이벤트.회의에 상정된 기업들의 시장투자등급 협의 결정등(buy.sell.neutral.positve.overweigh.run-up.down.)전반적인 시장 상황.전망 기업의 장단기 전망.목표주가등 고급정보를 교환하고 협의를 하는 회의인데 이회의에서 결정된 상황은 전체 시장참여자들에게 의무적으로 공표하게 되있고 시장참여자들의 공정한 정보의 공유를 목적으로 시창참여자들의 보호 차원에서 연방 증권관리 위원회 법으로 명시되 있다 2003년에 월가의 대형은행(골드만.시티.리만브라더.베어스턴.메릴린치.제이피모간.모간스텐리.BofA....) 들이 암묵적으로 결탁해 에널들의 분석보고서를 악용한 것이드러나 벌금을 14억$을 추징 당하고 모든 시장참여자들의 공정한 정보와 거래를 위한 법이 강화되고 각 trader(개인.기관.회사 자체자금 운용) 의 구분을 엄격히 구분 모든 업무영역을 구분.단절 하여 운용하게 시스템화 되었다.

그런데 월스트리트에서 입수한 골드만의 내부문건에 의하면 그동안 "trading huddle" 이라는 회의를 매일 주제하고 회의에서 논의되고 결정된 사항을 모든 시장 참여자들에게 공표 하도록 하게 되어 있는데 공표는 고사하고 어떤 결정 사항은 알부 특수고객과(기관.개인 포함) 회사 자금운용trader(Proprietary trading)의 내부적인 이해관계를 위해 정보를 남용하고 심지어는 외곡 까지 하고 있는 것으로 밝혀졌다 예를들면 결정된 고급정보를 먼저 회의가 끝나면 우선 이해관계에 따라 특수관계에 있는 고객에게 우선 정보를 제공하고 시장이 예상대로 등락을 한뒤에 보통 일주일후에 전체 시장참여자들 에게 공표하는 식이었다 그 발표를 믿고 투자를한 시장참여자는 손실을 보는 것은 불보듯이 뻔한 것이고 요약 하자면 타켓이된 기업의 전망이 좋게 분석이 되면 사전에 시장참여자들 에게는"a lackluster neutral"(매도를 하라는 의미로 완곡한 표현임) 로 발표하고 실제로는 회의에서 buy(positive) 로 결정하고 이해관계가 있는 특수고객 한테 우선 통보를 하여 주식을 매입하게 한다 그와 반대의 경우도 마찬 가지이다 참으로 후한무치한 일이 아닐 수 없는 것이다(월가의 생리에 대해서는 8/24알 글에서 일부 애기는 했지만) 월가에서는 어쩌면 당연한 일인지도 모른다 그보다 더한일도 현재의 금융위기를 통하여 우리는 직접 보고.듣고 있는 것이다 앞으로도 월가 금융산업의 본성과 행태는 변하지 않을 것이다 그 탐욕과 부패 커낵션은 책을 한권을 써도 모자랄 것이다.

내부문건에 대한 월스트리트의 문의에 대해 골드만의 답변은 항상 그래 왔드시 골드만은 고객 제일 주의로 모든 거래는 "fair trading"을 해왔고 지금도 변함이 없고 에널들의 분석은 장단기 분석 전망을 하는 것으로 장기적으로는 분석이 일관되고 변함이 없다고 짧게 답변을 하고 있고.. 회의에 참석한 에널들을 접촉하여 답변을 요구하면 다른 애기는 부연해서 할말이 없다고 하고 회의에서 결정된 전망과 분석은 변함이 없다고 애기만 할뿐이다 항상 그들이 하는 판에 박힌 답변 그대로 앵무새처럼 계속 똑같은 애기만 지껄일 뿐이다 불과 얼마전 까지 파산선고 문앞에 까지가서 미국민의 세금으로 엄청난 연방정부의 도움으로(약 12조8000억$로 추정하고 있음) 목숨을 연명하고 끊어져가는 목숨을 구하고 지금도 각종 편법으로 연방정부의 도움을 받고 있으면서 아직도 구태를 못버리고 시장 참여자들을 기만하여 얻은 수익으로 엄청난 보너스를 챙기는 철면피로 베니스의 상인에 나오는 샤일록처럼 지금 이순간에도 악마에게 영혼을 팔며 탐욕과 오만의 가증 스러운 미소를 짖고 있는 것이다 우리나라의 사회의 기득권으로 부터 소외 받고 있는 서민들인 소액 투자자들은 두번다시 기만 당하지 말고 현명한 선택을 하리라 믿으며......

2009.8.26.새벽.처용.

PS; 아래는 월스트리트지의 원문입니다 잠고 하실 부탁드립니다.중간 부분에 실례를든 도표가 있읍니다.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. research analyst Marc Irizarry's published rating on mutual-fund managerJanus Capital Group Inc. was a lackluster "neutral" in early April 2008. But at an internal meeting that month, the analyst told dozens of Goldman's traders the stock was likely to head higher, company doc-uments show.

The next day, research-department employees at Goldman called about 50 favored clients of the big securities firm with the same tip, including hedge-fund companies Citadel Investment Group and SAC Capital Advisors, the doc-uments indicate. Readers of Mr. Irizarry's research didn't find out he was bullish until his written report was issued six days later, after Janus shares had jumped 5.8%.

[Goldman's Trading Tips Reward Its Biggest Clients]

Every week, Goldman analysts offer stock tips at a gathering the firm calls a "trading huddle." But few of the thousands of clients who receive Goldman's written research reports ever hear about the recommendations.

At the meetings, Goldman analysts identify stocks they think are likely to rise or fall due to earnings announcements, the direction of the overall market or other short-term developments. Some of their recommendations differ from ratings printed in Goldman's widely circulated research reports. Some Goldman traders who make bets with the firm's own money attend the meetings.

Critics complain that Goldman's distribution of the trading ideas on-ly to its own traders and key clients hurts other customers who aren't given the opportunity to trade on the information.

Deal Journal: Goldman's Analysts Take nulle for the Team

Securities laws require firms like Goldman to engage in "fair dealing with customers," and prohibit analysts from issuing opinions that are at odds with their true beliefs about a stock. Steven Strongin, Goldman's stock research chief, says no on-e gains an unfair advantage from its trading huddles, and that the short-term-trading ideas are not contrary to the longer-term stock forecasts in its written research.

Former Goldman client George Klopfer of Park City, Utah, who was unaware of the trading tips until recently, says the practice is unfair. "When I joined Goldman as a client, I got all these fancy brochures saying they put the client first," he says. "I just don't want to have to worry about them or big clients trading on stuff like this. I was at the end of the food chain." He says he pulled out most of the $20 million in his account earlier this year after losing money on several Goldman funds. Goldman says individual clients like Mr. Klopfer typically have a long-term investing approach and are not focused on individual stocks.

Since the trading huddles began about two years ago, Goldman has supplied "trading ideas" on hundreds of stocks to the traders and top clients, according to internal doc-uments reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

Goldman spokesman Edward Canaday says the tips are "market color" and "always consistent with the fundamental analysis" in published research reports. "Analysts are expected to discuss events that may have a near-term or short-term impact on a stock's price," he says, even if that is a different direction from an analyst's overall forecast. Goldman's published research reports include a disclosure that "salespeople, traders and other professionals" may take positions that are contrary to the opinions expressed in reports. But the firm doesn't disclose the trading huddles.

Mr. Canaday says analysts are told that any comment at a meeting that could result in a change in a rating, earnings estimate or stock-price target "must be published and disseminated broadly to all clients." He adds, however, that it is rare that tips arising from the meetings reach that threshold. He says ratings changes after the meetings also are rare.

The tips usually go to top clients who have expressed interest in having the information and have short-term investment horizons, he says. Goldman doesn't want to overload other clients with information that isn't relevant to them, he says. "We are not in the business of serving thousands of retail customers," he says.

At least on-e competitor discloses such trading tips much more broadly. Morgan Stanley's research department sends blast emails with short-term views on various stocks to thousands of clients, and posts the information on its Web site. It doesn't call customers to convey the tips, because Morgan Stanley officials decided that could expose the firm to questions about selective disclosure, according to people familiar with the matter.

View Full Image

Goldman's Trading Tips Reward Big Clients

Critics of Goldman, its New York headquarters shown above, complain that the firm's limited distribution of trading tips hurts small customers who don't share the information.

"The spirit of the law is twofold," says Eric Dinallo, who in 2003, when serving as a deputy to former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, helped negotiate a $1.4 billion stock-research settlement with 10 major Wall Street firms, including Goldman. "Analysts should give consistent advice to all their customers, be they small investors or big trading clients." Any views that differ from an analyst's published rating but are "worth sharing with certain customers," he says, should be made "available to everyone."

The 2003 case involved allegations that Wall Street firms were issuing overly optimistic stock research in order to win more lucrative investment-banking business. The settlement, in which Goldman and the other firms didn't admit or deny wrongdoing, erected walls between research and investment banking. Securities laws currently require research analysts to personally certify that their reports accurately reflect their views of a stock.

Some analysts have gotten into big trouble by contradicting themselves. In 2003, former Merrill Lynch & Co. technology analyst Henry Blodget agreed to a lifetime ban from the securities industry after touting stocks that he disparaged in private emails.

These days, analysts must juggle growing demands from trading units at their firms. Such operations have emerged as big moneymakers, fueling the record $3.44 billion in net income at Goldman in the second quarter. A large portion of Goldman's profit came from trades done for mutual funds, pension funds, endowments, hedge funds and other big institutional investors. Proprietary trading, in which Goldman makes bets with its own capital, accounts for about 10% of its profits.

Analysts have a financial incentive to give clients useful information. Goldman sets aside roughly 50% of money allotted each year to analyst compensation to distribute based on feedback from trading customers. The balance of analysts' pay is determined by the performance of their stock picks. That pay system is common among major Wall Street firms.

At many firms, traders, salespeople and analysts hold early-morning calls to review ratings changes, recommendations and market events. Throughout the day, analysts talk to key clients to help them interpret research reports and provide more detail on specific events such as earnings.

The research business is considered a loss leader at most firms, despite persistent attempts by Goldman and other securities giants to squeeze more revenue from it. Goldman was looking for a leg up on rivals when it started the trading huddles in 2007. That year, Goldman ranked ninth in Institutional Investor magazine's annual list of the best equity analysts, as determined by a survey of big institutional investors. Goldman was rated eighth in last year's competition.

The huddles began in earnest around the time Goldman's research department got a new boss, Mr. Strongin. He came to the firm in 1994 from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, where he had been director of monetary-policy research. At Goldman, he had run the commodities-research operation, then was co-chief operating officer of the whole research unit, before being asked to run it in April 2007.

Mr. Strongin, 51 years old, set out to improve Goldman's research operations. The firm asked important clients for suggestions. nulle idea that took hold was giving certain customers and traders more access to stock tips.

The idea was controversial with some Goldman research staffers. "I am not sure we should be giving recommendations that go against our research," said on-e Goldman employee at a meeting where the trading huddles were discussed, according to on-e attendee.

Laura Conigliaro, Goldman's co-head of research in the Americas region, replied at the meeting that the firm needed to respond to inevitable differences in the time horizons of investors. Issuing a short-term buy recommendation wasn't necessarily at odds with a lukewarm "neutral" rating for the long run, she added.

One recipient of the trading tips, Steve Eisman, a managing director of hedge fund Frontpoint Partners LLC, says that he likes the back-and-forth he now has with Goldman's analysts, and that he pays attention to some of the tips. "A few years ago, Goldman wouldn't make a negative call on anything," he says. "Now they say it like it is."

The huddles can last from 20 minutes to on-e hour, according to participants. Analysts are encouraged to bring a trading idea. They talk with Goldman traders about the financial markets and events that could trigger movement of specific stocks. Goldman specifies how long each recommendation is in effect, often on-e week.

At a huddle on July 31, for example, the firm's technology analysts and traders discussed more than a dozen stocks, ranging from Garmin Ltd. to Microsoft Corp. None of the analysts said anything that appeared to differ from their stock ratings.

Compliance officers sit in on almost all the meetings, Goldman says. Research analysts say they have been guided on what language to use in the huddles. Words like "buy" and "sell" are to be avoided, while "run up," "give back" and "oversold" are encouraged. Internal doc-uments reviewed by the Journal initially tracked the trading-huddle tips as "buy" or "sell," but now refer to them as "up" or "down."

Research-department employees prepare telephone scripts, then call top clients, typically several hours after the meeting has ended. Goldman says its in-house traders are prohibited from trading on the tips until after they've been relayed to clients.

nulls reviewed by the Journal indicate that anywhere from six to 60 clients are contacted, depending on the investment. For example, clients specializing in financial stocksare given recommendations about that sector. Each call typically includes comments about the overall market and the kinds of investors Goldman believes are propelling it, and ends with a stock tip.

The meeting where Mr. Irizarry suggested that Janus shares were worth buying, held on April 2, 2008, was attended by Goldman's financial-research analysts and traders who handle customer orders. It also included another class of traders called "franchise risk managers," who sit with and advise the traders handling customer orders -- and make bets with Goldman's money.

Typically, traders who wager firm capital are walled off from those handling customer orders so that they don't take advantage of information about client trading, which securities regulations forbid. Goldman says its franchise risk managers don't trade on client information and must first share trading-huddle tips with clients before acting on the tips themselves.

At the April 2 meeting, Goldman says, Mr. Irizarry was expressing a sentiment about Janus similar to on-e contained in a report Goldman published the previous day. A chart in that report, Goldman says, cited a report from mutual-fund-research firm Morningstar Inc. that was positive on Janus. While internal doc-uments show Mr. Irizarry's rating on Janus stock at the time was "neutral," they note the "price action expected" was "up." Mr. Irizarry declined to comment.

The day after the meeting, Goldman told selected clients that "in particular, we highlight Janus," according to an internal doc-ument.

At the same April 2 trading huddle, Goldman analyst Thomas Cholnoky said he favored MetLife Inc. over other insurers, according to notes from the meeting. Internal doc-uments indicate he believed the stock would rise over the short run.

Hours after the meeting, Mr. Cholnoky released a research report that reiterated his "neutral" rating on MetLife, saying he hadn't changed his estimates. Goldman says his view about the company's favorable short-term prospects is clearly conveyed in a research note issued prior to the huddle, which said the insurer "stands to be the biggest beneficiary from the steepening yield curve."

A week later, Mr. Cholnoky boosted his rating on MetLife to a buy, and Goldman added the stock to its "America's Buy List" of top stock recommendations. Mr. Cholnoky said he expected MetLife's quarterly results, due in a few weeks, to "surprise on the upside." (The quarterly results, when they came out, did slightly.) Mr. Cholnoky, who no longer works at Goldman, didn't respond to messages seeking comment.

Goldman says that in both these cases the analysts' views were consistent with the published research, which included a 12-month price target that was above each stock's price at the time.

Morgan Stanley also generates short-term views on various stocks, which it calls "Research Tactical Ideas" and distributes widely via email and the firm's Web site. In May, for example, it told clients that insurer Aflac Inc.'s earnings guidance would be "softer than many investors expect." Its rating on Aflac at the time was "neutral."

In its longer-term reports published by analysts, Morgan Stanley discloses that it issues such trading tips, and that the tips on any given stock "may be contrary to the recommendations or views expressed in this or other research on the same stock."

Last year, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the industry's self-regulatory body, proposed new rules meant to clarify existing disclosure obligations under the rule requiring "fair dealing" with all clients. Firms could issue contradictory ratings as long as clients were told that such inconsistencies were possible.

A Finra spokesman said the agency still is reviewing comment letters filed in response to the proposal. Goldman hasn't commented on the proposed rules.

Write to Susanne Craig at susanne.craig@wsj.com

Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A16

This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use on-ly. Distribution and use of this material are governed by our Subscriber Agreement and by copyright law. For non-personal use or to order multiple copies, please contact Dow Jones Reprints at 1-800-843-0008 or visit

www.djreprints.com